Starting from the new institutionalist premise of the differential receptivity of organisations to change, this essay examines the French administrative reform process between 1989-97. The two key reforms undertaken during this period both sought to delegate greater managerial autonomy to the ministerial field service level. We undertook semi-structured interviews with officials in the field services of three French ministries (Education, Agriculture and Infrastructure) in the Champagne-Ardennes region, as well as with members of the wider policy communities. The capacity of the field services to adopt a proactive approach to management reform depended on five key variables: internal organisational dynamics; the attitude of the central services to meso-level autonomy; the degree of institutional receptivity to change; the type of service delivery, and the extent of penetration in local networks. The Infrastructure Ministry was more receptive to management change than either Education or (especially) Agriculture, a receptivity that reflects the institutional diversity of the French administrative system, and that supports new institutionalist arguments. The essay rejects straightforward convergence to the NPM norm. Though the direction of change is rather similar in France to comparable countries, changes in public management norms require either endogenous discursive shifts or else need to be interpreted in terms of domestic registers that are acceptable or understandable to those charged with implementing reform.
Since the 1980s, the administrative reform agenda of OECD countries has been subjected to the growing influence of managerial ideas and practices which has been collectively referred to as 'New Public Management' (NPM) (Aucoin 1990; Wright 1994a; Ridley 1996) . The attraction of such managerial concepts has been attributed to the financial constraints incurred as a result of the economic downturn in Western Europe since the 1970s and the subsequent need to contain public expenditure (Ridley, 1996) . NPM advocates an end to the dichotomy between the public and private sectors and the deployment of private sector practices to improve the efficiency of public administration (Hood, 1994) . This method places a greater emphasis on outputs and the attainment of results rather than an adherence to the general rules of procedure, which typified the traditional approach to public administration.
Hood (1991) identifies the following seven doctrines as comprising the NPM agenda:
 hands on professional management with public managers being given managerial autonomy and held accountable for their actions  the definition of targets and the evaluation of the service's performance in terms of meeting those targets  greater emphasis on output controls with resources being allocated on the basis of results achieved  a shift to a disaggregation of units with centralised structures broken up into smaller manageable units  the introduction of greater competition within the public sector to encourage higher standards at lower costs  an emphasis on private sector styles of managerial practices  a stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use in order to encourage public sector bodies to maximise their use of dwindling public resources.
The fact that many of the NPM doctrines featured in the respective administrative reform agendas in OECD countries led to claims of a new global paradigm in public management. Aucoin (1990) and Osborne and Gaebler (1992) both suggest that there is a move towards a more entrepreneurial model of government amongst OECD countries to enable a more effective response to recent socio-economic developments and the challenges of today's world. In facing similar pressures for change, these authors argue that there will be a degree of institutional convergence in terms of countries being inclined to imitate each other.
Predictions of the emergence of a global paradigm have been criticised, however, on the grounds that they do not take into account a country's institutional traditions (Wright 1994; Ridley 1996) . The influence of institutional arrangements on a country's receptivity to change constitutes part of the new institutionalist approach to studying organisations. New institutionalism comprises a multi-theoretical approach to the study of institutions and organisational change and focuses on the way in which institutions embody values and power relationships (Hall and Taylor 1996; Lowndes 1996; Lowndes, 2001).
The aim of this paper is to establish whether the French administrative reform process undertaken between 1989 and 1997 can be categorised as convergent with the model outlined by Hood (1991); whether case-specific factors need to be incorporated into the convergence model, or whether convergent pressures produce discordant organisational responses. To prove the convergence hypothesis, we would need to demonstrate the capacity of the ministerial field service managers to engage in an autonomous reform process that falls within the general framework of reforms introduced in the majority of OECD countries. To refute the convergence hypothesis, we would need to demonstrate the reverse: namely a refusal on behalf of the field services to accept new managerial reforms, experienced as alien to accepted modes of appropriate behaviour. In either case we concur with Dreyfus (2002) that a micro-organisational analysis is required to understand organisational change and behaviour at this level.
To address these related questions, we undertook extensive fieldwork investigations into the effects of the 1989-92 Public Service Renewal and the 1995-97 Reform of the State programmes. Prior to considering the impact of the reform programmes, we will provide overview of the main institutional features of the French administrative system, the pressures for reform and how these underpinned the 1989-97 French administrative reform process.
The French Administrative System and Reforms
The French administrative system has its origins in the Napoleonic model of administration where it was viewed as a force that would embody the power and legitimacy of the French state and the general interest of the nation as a whole (Stevens, 1996) . This resulted in the establishment of a centralised and hierarchical administrative system which intervened in all aspects of the socio-economic life of the French nation (Knapp and Wright, 2001). Such state interventionism manifested itself in dirigisme, a statist pattern of decision making involving the state taking direct charge of the political and economic agendas and overseeing the implementation of public policy with minimal input from business interests (Schmidt, 1996) . The dirigiste tradition has declined since the 1980s, a by-product of the The French public policy literature identifies a set of challenges to the orthodox model of public policy-making from the 1980s onwards. Traditionally compartmentalised, inwardlooking and procedural, the French administrative system has been subjected to a variety of pressures for change, of which European integration, decentralisation and the influence of changing management norms are identified by Muller (1992 Muller ( , 2000 as the key drivers.
Growing European integration has increased pressures for greater inter-ministerial cooperation. Though French ministries remain highly compartmentalised (Smith, 2004) , there are pressures to adopt a more joined-up approach to European issues (Lequesne, 1993). The EU principle of subsidiarity, which stipulates that decisions should be taken at the lowest possible, has provided impetus for greater autonomy to be delegated to the subnational levels, especially the regions, regional field services and prefectures (Oberdorff, 1992).
Furthermore, the drive to achieve the convergence criteria for economic and monetary union has resulted in cost saving measures being taken to reduce public expenditure. In this way, the effects of Europeanisation have influenced the French administrative reform agenda. The third theme constituted a commitment to evaluate the performance of public services in order to strengthen the accountability for both the policy and managerial performance of public programmes. An institutionalised and permanent system of evaluation was established with an Inter-Ministerial Committee for Evaluation, responsible for coordinating the process and for identifying those services or projects to be evaluated. Finally, there was a drive to improve the reception facilities and the quality of service provision to users. Services were to be made more user-friendly and accessible to the public through the use of new technology, the simplification of administrative procedures, and improved reception facilities with a more personalised service. As part of this drive, a Charter for The reform measures were structured around three main concepts (Service Public, 1996, p7). Firstly, the concept of a more simplified state sought to simplify state structures and procedures in order to facilitate public understanding of its processes. Measures included the improvement in the response times to public queries and each administrative service being required to display a Quality Charter that set out the commitments of the particular service to the user through identifying quantitative targets. Secondly, there was a drive to achieve a more accessible State to ensure that decisions were taken closer to the local communities on whom they impacted. This was to be largely facilitated through further administrative decentralisation in human resource management and a rationalisation in the number of field services and corps to ensure more effective personnel management at local level.
Finally, the notion of a more responsible State aimed to make the French State more accountable for its actions. Field services were to be delegated greater managerial autonomy in the operation of their services especially in budgetary matters in order that they could be held directly accountable for their performance instead of the central ministry, which would assume a more supervisory role. A new appraisal system was envisaged which would assess the actual performance of officials. Additional measures sought to minimise the volume of regulations emanating from Paris through the prior analysis of a bill's anticipated impact and to maximise the French administration's real estate through conducting an inventory of usage.
In the Field
Both the Public Service Renewal and the Reform of the State programmes viewed the ministerial field services as constituting the main impetus to change in what Guyomarch (1999) describes as 'a process of innovation at the periphery'. For the field services, the reforms represented a move away from compliance with procedures towards a more managerial ethos of attainment of targets. In this way, the reforms represented a cultural challenge for the field services in acquiring greater autonomy in their operational management and reducing their dependency on the central Ministries (Trosa 1995). The reforms envisaged the field services having greater control in determining the means by which policy objectives were to be achieved within a policy and resources framework set by the central ministry.
We carried out extensive fieldwork investigations in the ministerial field services during the period 1996-7 1 . We decided to focus upon the field services because the reform process had delegated them greater autonomy in their operational management. As the purpose of the empirical research was to ascertain the effects of the French administrative reform process on the ministerial field services, we adopted an actor-centred research methodology. Semi- We deliberately chose a small n. case (the three ministries) and used the semi-structured interview as our favoured methodological tool. We preferred a qualitative approach based on detailed interviews as more appropriate for understanding the actual dynamics of administrative change (the research question) than a quantitative approach ill-suited for the purpose. Drawing contrasts between three ministries allowed us to identify probable commonalities shared by other meso-level public administrations, as well as to identify sectorally specific influences in Education, Agriculture and Infrastructure. By selecting Champagne-Ardennes, we chose deliberately to investigate a non-exceptional French region. There is no tradition of strong regional identity, or of peripheral opposition to Paris.
The territorial structure is rather typical of many of France's 22 regions. There is competition between the regional capital (Châlons-sur-Champagne) and the largest city,
Reims. There is a standard degree of institutional rivalry between the regional council, the four departmental councils and city structures such as the Reims agglomeration. The political opportunity structure was rather representative of mainland France, with the main political competition between the centre-left PS, the centre-right UDF and Gaullist (RPR)
parties and the far-right Front national (FN). The Champagne-Ardennes region thus presented an ideal neutral terrain for observing the activities of the field services. 
The Education Ministry
More than any other, the Education ministry is organised along regional lines. Mainland
France is divided for educational purposes into 24 sub-national academies, which more or less correspond to France's 22 regions (though there are three academies in the vast Ile-de- which these were to be achieved. As part of the process of devising targets, each division within the rectorate was required to reflect upon its own role and how it contributed to the operations of the service as a whole. It was hoped that this would induce greater cooperation between the divisions, and mark a move away from the traditional compartmentalised working practices, though there was no firm evidence that it had produced this effect.
More tangible change was noticeable within the operation of the main divisions, which were each delegated greater autonomy in determining ways in which the quality of their service provision could be improved to the public. Staff in the exams division had used this opportunity to carry out an audit on the time spent on responding to outside queries. The outcome of the audit was a recommendation that a receptionist be appointed in the light of findings showing that 30% of staff's time was spent responding to queries of this nature.
Similarly, in the division for inspectors and administrative staff, officials recommended an improvement in internal communication channels between the various sections comprising the division in order to improve the response time to internal and external queries.
Respondents found these experiences motivating owing to their perception that they were actively contributing to the rectorate's goal of improving its service to French citizens.
Computerisation was also found to have had a positive impact on the rectorate's operations, both through enabling the secretary-general to have a better understanding of the service's operations and in permitting officials to undertake projects in their entirety, thereby reducing their reliance on the line manager.
If management reform brought some benefits, the reform programmes were severely criticised across the rectorate. Firstly, the financial room for manoeuvre afforded under the cost centre scheme was minimised by the regulatory controls imposed by the local paymaster of the Finance Ministry. The section head of the Financial Affairs division referred to how the local paymaster still required a justification for all items of expenditure, enhanced budgetary decentralisation notwithstanding. Moreover, the Finance ministry insisted upon the need for the rectorate to forecast accurately its predicted expenditure on operational costs (in theory at the discretion of the field service) at the beginning of the financial year. The continuing weight of the Finance ministry on the daily operations of the Educational field service was resented and undermined the innovation of the cost centre scheme. At the same time, budgetary cutbacks were introduced as part of an overall drive to reduce public expenditure. As a result, the central ministry reneged on its financial commitments to the field service under the cost centre agreement. This decision made it more difficult for the service to achieve its targets within the specified time frame. This episode highlighted the problem of 'pluriannual' policy initiatives in a context marked by the annual budgetary process.
A number of related themes emerged from interviews within the Reims rectorate, three of which elucidate the difficulties of implementing public service reform in France. We will consider these in order of increasing importance. First, staff motivation was identified as being one major obstacle to successful implementation, since financial shortages often resulted in a greater workload being undertaken by fewer personnel. Second, the trade unions were openly suspicious of moves to delegate greater responsibility to the field services, fearing this would lead to privatisation and an eroding of the established concept of public service. But the main obstacle related to the difficulties felt by permanent officials to adapt culturally to exercising greater managerial autonomy, as they were used to functioning in a hierarchical relationship with the central ministry. Officials complained of a lack of training to cope with new responsibilities and about the volume and complexity of regulations emanating from the central ministry that they were required to apply to their working practices. Somewhat paradoxically, the growing workload incurred by the new regulatory framework served to reinforce traditional perceptions of the field service officials' role as implementers of policy, rather than being innovators at the periphery. This Consistent with the actor-centred approach we identified above, we now venture inside the regional service of the Agricultural ministry. As in Education, the main benefit of the reforms cited by the regional director and his deputy was the allocation of a globalised budget to cover operational costs. Such budgetary decentralisation had the potential to permit cross-transfers between budgetary categories and enabled the directorate to have more control in the deployment of its resources. The regional director also pointed to greater autonomy in human resource management through having greater discretion in determining salary levels, providing the length of service and the grade of a particular official were taken into account, and through being able to determine the choice of department for a new member of staff. However, in the view of most respondents in the directorate, regulatory controls and severe resourcing shortages negated these benefits. The requirement for detailed budgetary forecasting and the need for subsequent revisions to require the approval of the local paymaster minimised any financial room for manoeuvre afforded by the globalised budgets for operational costs. Furthermore, both the regional director and his deputy maintained that budgetary cutbacks impeded the directorate's capacity to discharge even its core responsibilities, let alone any new initiatives. Not only did the directorate had difficulty in paying its heating and telephone bills, but staff who transferred to other services or who retired were not being replaced. In ten years, the number of staff working in the directorate had fallen from 75 to its level (in 1996) of 35. Furthermore, the budgetary cutbacks had affected the ability of the directorate to apply key aspects of the reform programmes to its operations. This was particularly evident in relation to the drive to improve reception facilities, where financial shortages had forced to regional director to cut back on the receptionist post in the service.
According to all respondents, the budgetary cutbacks had a serious effect on the morale of staff, making it difficult for the officials in the directorate to undertake all the functions that were required of them. There was disillusionment with the reform process amongst staff because of its association with dwindling resources. There was also a lack of incentives for participation in the reform process, with the regional director arguing that the civil service code provided little discretion to reward hard working officials. Under the current appraisal system, length of service and grade still remained the key criteria for promotion, with minimal inducement for officials to strive to improve their performance. Respondents pointed to how this system was upheld by the trade unions, justified by the doctrine of equality of opportunity and treatment amongst officials.
The directorate continued to maintain a hierarchical relationship with its central ministry. Most data collection took place in the regional directorate of the Infrastructure ministry based in Châlons-en-Champagne. The role of the regional directorate was to formulate technical policies in construction, planning and highways maintenance, as well as having responsibility for the distribution of state funds in infrastructure, housing and town planning. In addition, the regional directorate worked closely with local businesses on industrial policies and socio-economic development and with local authorities in terms of road construction. The empirical research collected from the regional directorate is shown in Figure 3 .
The regional director cited two main benefits of the reforms. Firstly, the provision of a globalised budget to cover operational costs facilitated the transfer of funds between budgetary categories to cover any anticipated shortfalls. The directorate had the potential to devise new resourcing combinations that would underpin those areas of strategic priority for the service. Secondly, the directorate was delegated greater responsibility in managing its administrative staff in respect of their appraisals, promotion boards and disciplinary procedures now being conducted at local level. There was also an increased emphasis on training for staff to enable them to contend with their newly allocated responsibilities. The regional director pointed out that the directorate was receptive to the application of private sector practices to its operations, as envisaged by the respective reform programmes, owing to its close working relationship with private businesses. experienced by the directorate entailed difficulties for the service in discharging its core responsibilities, which was particularly problematic in the light of the collaborative work undertaken with local businesses. Accordingly, one technician interviewed feared that such cutbacks would undermine his unit's reputation for innovation and high quality work, which might lead local businesses to look elsewhere for technical support. Nevertheless, the regional director claimed that the directorate's previous experience of budgetary autonomy and exposure to private sector practices made it better equipped than field services in other
Ministries in contending with resourcing shortages.
Budgetary cutbacks increased the workload amongst declining numbers of staff. The officials interviewed complained that increasing volumes of work precluded their participation in the working groups that were set up to discuss how the reform measures would apply to the directorate's operations. Respondents claimed that a key source of their growing workload were the difficulties in adapting centrally devised directives to the local context. Their main contention, not shared by the regional director, was that the central ministry had unrealistic expectations of its field services in terms of the staffing and resources available at this level. The situation was compounded by the increase in regulatory controls to which the directorate was subjected to ensure that the service was discharging its responsibilities in accordance with the expectations of the central ministry.
The regional division of the Infrastructure ministry was the most independent and innovative of our sample. Its ability to develop a territorial focus was strengthened by the nature of its policy activity (bringing Infrastructure into daily contact with local and regional authorities), by its location within local communities, as well as its powerful position within the French State. Ultimately, the Infrastructure ministry is more threatened than either Education or Agriculture by the related movements of decentralisation (which empowers other authorities and agencies) and Europeanisation (especially EU competition policy which has opened up public tenders). Complying with the spirit of the Public Service and Reform of the State programmes made organisational sense, as it could only enhance the ministries' reputation for efficiency and technical expertise.
Evaluation of Research Findings
In the introduction we set out to investigate whether public administration in France has converged with those in a majority of OECD countries in adopting the norms of New Public The capacity of the field services to engage in management reforms testified to a diversity in receptivity to change within the French administrative system. We were sensitive to the diversity of approaches adopted on the ground by the field services of the different Closely related to service delivery, the proximity to local or regional policy networks is another important variable. The development of a regional public sphere is an essential feature of sub-central French governance. By regional public sphere, we signify an arena within which a plurality of organisations interacts. These include local and regional authorities (empowered since the early 1980s), regional prefectures, the regional field 
